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Trace Substances, Science and Law:
Perspectives from the Social Sciences*
James F. Short, Jr.**
Introduction
A few years ago, I was invited, as an outsider to the field of natural
disaster studies, to contribute a commentary on a series of papers
written by insiders to that field on the role of taxonomy in disaster
research. I titled my paper, On Defining, Describing and Explaining
Elephants (and Reactions to Them): Hazards, Disasters, and Risk
Analysis.1
In his introduction to the special issue of the journal in which the
papers were published, the editor noted that "because the range of
hazards facing humankind is broad and arguably increasing, the
research agenda of researchers and practitioners purporting to
understand them must keep apace." 2 Concerns with trace substances
are a major reason for the arguably increasing range of hazards facing
humankind. We now know - more importantly, we have the
capability of knowing - vastly more about possibly toxic substances in
the food we eat, the water we drink and the air we breath. We know, or
can know, about these and other hazards in the home, the workplace
and in local communities throughout the globe. This "good news,"
however, has several consequences, and that basically is my topic.
* Prepared for the Am. Assn. Adv. Sci. Symposium on "Trace Substances: Impact
of Recent Instrumental Advances on Regulatory Affairs," Feb. 23, 1994. I am grateful
to Eugene Rosa, William R. Freudenburg & Lee Clarke for guidance and incisive
comments. Remaining faults in the paper are, of course, my own.
** Dr. Short i s or Emeritus of Sociology at Washington State University, and
a past president of the American Sociological Association. He has a B.A. from
Denison University and M.A. and Ph.D. from the Universityr of Chicago - all in
Sociology.
1 7 Int'l J. Mass Emergencies & Disasters 397 (1989).
2 Gary Kreps, The Boundaries of Disaster Research: Taxonomy and Comparative
Study, 7 Int' J. Mass Emergencies & Disasters 213 (1989).
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Most readers of this paper surely will agree that advances in trace
element discovery have at least two benefits: they increase awareness of
hazards (old and new), and they are critical to the remediation,
reduction and prevention of such hazards. While granting these
benefits, and granting also that we are, on average, healthier and safer
than our forebears, it appears nevertheless that the. U.S. public is more,
rather than less, concerned about risk than at any time in recent history.
Several years ago, a lighter side of this seeming paradox was
discussed in an Art Buchwald column that described his visit to
Flagstaff, Arizona. At 8,000 feet, Flagstaff enjoys relatively pollution-
free air. Buchwald reported that shortly after his arrival he began to feel
ill. The feeling persisted until he walked past an auto repair garage and
caught a strong whiff of exhaust fumes, after which he immediately felt
better! He sustained himself for the remainder of his visit by
periodically returning to get his fix of fumes. While this "case study"
may be subject to a variety of interpretations, nevertheless, many
beleaguered citizens feel that, to the old adage, "Everything I want to
do is either illegal, immoral, or fattening" must be added, "or risks
toxic exposure." As my wife said to me while we were discussing this
paper, "You can't live without being at risk." Precisely, and, of course.
What to do with and about the knowledge gained by advances in
trace element discovery must be an important agenda item for the
larger society and for individuals, institutions and organizations with
special interests in such discoveries. Here again I find myself in the role
of an outsider to the scientific and technological advances being
discussed. And once again the parable of the blind men and the
elephant seems appropriate, as it is to so many cutting edge scientific
and technological issues. For how one views trace element discoveries
- and how one reacts to them - depends on many considerations,
e.g., which elements are at issue and what is known about their health
effects, what interests are affected (e.g., corporate, environmental,
governmental interests), and how they are affected, as well as by the
nature of one's personal stake in them (e.g., whether one's health or job
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may be directly affected). It depends, also, as numerous studies have
demonstrated, on the extent to which people feel they have control over
the possible consequences of such discoveries.
My point, of course, is that trace element discoveries do not simply
enter the storehouse of knowledge, to the enlightenment and benefit of
all. They often raise more questions than they answer, questions that
have often unknown implications for individuals, and more importantly
for families and other organizations and institutions. Why "more
importantly"? Because families are what people care about most, and
organizations and institutions (including governments) define the terms
in which the discovery of trace elements are interpreted and acted
upon, as they do in virtually all risk-related matters. Anthropologist
Mary Douglas observes, "individuals have no other way to make the big
decisions except within the scope of institutions they build."3
Moreover, only organizations and institutions have the power to define
the significance of discoveries and to make decisions concerning how
they are used and with what consequences. Elaine Draper's research
concerning how these matters are handled in the workplace illustrates
this point most effectively. 4 Among the most important of the
institutions interpreting and acting are science, engineering and
medicine, as well as legislative bodies, regulatory agents and agencies,
corporations, mass media and public interest groups.
Trace Element Discovery and Cultural Lag
Trace element technology and discoveries present us with special
cases of cultural lag, a term introduced by my mentor at the University
of Chicago, William F. Ogburn, many years ago.5 He noted that the
many elements of culture do not change at the same rates. Of particular
relevance, science and technology tend to change more rapidly than do
institutions that must adapt to them, institutions such as business and
industry, government, education, the family and religion. Adaptation is
3 How Institutions Think (1986).
4 Risky Business: Genetic Testing and Exclusionary Practices in the Hazardous
Workplace (1991).
5 Social Change (1922).
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not a one-way street, of course, and it is the interdependence of
institutions that makes cultural lags important. Note, however, that
advances in science and technology, along with economic and national
security interests, are especially powerful engines of social change that
often require adaptations by other institutions.
Cultural lags lead to social dislocations and to other problems, e.g.,
when the ability to discover traces of toxic elements outstrips
knowledge of their medical or public health significance or when the
ability to create new chemicals proceeds more rapidly than knowledge
concerning their toxicity. Consider, also, the recency of technologies
for the discovery of trace elements, and the vast improvements that
have been made in these technologies, compared to the much slower
development of knowledge of toxicity and health significance. The
National Academy complex of Science, Engineering, Medicine and the
National Research Council (NRC) has been much concerned with such
matters. A NRC panel concerned with identification and testing of
toxic and potentially toxic chemicals reported that "of tens of
thousands of commercially important chemicals, only a few have been
subjected to extensive toxicity testing and most have scarcely been
tested at all." 6 Moreover, of 664 toxicity tests evaluated, only 27%
were judged by the panel to be acceptable. A decade later the toxicity
of chemicals - and what to do about it - remain among the most
controversial issues facing science, medicine, government and public
interest groups, as well as business and industry.7 What to do about
recent advances in trace element discovery is at least as significant an
issue as are the discoveries themselves.
My colleague Kai Erikson has labeled "toxic emergencies a new
species of trouble." 8 Why new, and how different? Toxic
6 Pepper Leeper, Finding the Bad Actors in a World of Chemicals, 34 News
Report National Academy of Sciences 4 (1984).
7 Phillip H. Abelson, Toxic Terror; Phantom Risks, 262 Science 407 (1993);
Michael D. Green, Letter, 262 Science 638 (1993); BernardWeiss, Letter, 262 Science
638 (1993); David Redfield, 262 Science 638 (1993) (letter).
8 A New Species of Trouble, in Communities at Risk- Collective Responses to
Technological Hazards 11 (Stephen Robert Couch & J. Stephen Kroll-Smith eds.
1991).
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contamination affects the air, the aquifers and the soil on which we are
dependent. Some toxic emergencies seem never to end and to be
irremediable. They are "not bounded" as most natural disasters such as
floods and earthquakes are bounded in time and in space.
Also, toxic contamination often betrays the senses, proving false our
sense of security in our ability to see, hear, smell, touch or taste danger.
Disasters of all sorts often undermine self confidence in one's ability to
protect self and loved ones - witness reactions to recent earthquakes in
California. Toxic contamination may be especially pernicious in this
regard because, so clearly associated with human agency, it may
undermine confidence in institutions that have been erected to protect
us from harm. In all of these ways, toxic contamination seems especially
threatening to our ability to control danger. -
Most toxic discoveries do not, of course, signify immediate danger
or emergency. They may, however, contribute to the sense of
vulnerability to forces beyond personal, if not beyond human, control.
Paradoxically, they may contribute also to distrust of science and
technology; even to distrust of logic and reason as ways to explain and
control what is going on. And that may be the most fearsome
possibility of all - loss of trust in the institutions - including science
- that must cope with problems of toxic contamination on behalf of
all of us.
Lags Among Sciences, Technologies and the Law
Some cultural lags within science are especially pernicious in matters
related to regulation. Among these are the lag between basic knowledge
(e.g., concerning carcinogenicity) and the success of technologies such
as those that are involved in trace element discovery; lags between
discoveries of associations between toxic substances and cancers and
knowledge of fundamental mechanisms involved in cancers; and what
might be called lags between "production science" and "impact science"
- e.g., knowledge about how to produce chemicals and technologies
versus knowledge about associated impacts and risks.
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These lags are special for a variety of reasons. The spectacular
successes of science and the dominance of scientific approaches to
economic production and governance in modern societies9 have
resulted in higher expectations and, increasingly, in some circles,
cynicism concerning science, scientists and the technologies they spawn.
Some of these problems result from governmental decisions, as when
regulations require testing on a broad scale, thus giving rise to a host of
problems, among them opportunities for fraud and incompetence,
testing by technologists with little understanding of the science
involved, and further lags as new scientific knowledge supersedes that
upon which regulations are based. 10 "Bad science" experience with
public and private laboratories in these respects is not encouraging. 11
Regulation is not the only government-related issue that is affected
by cultural lags. Nor is it always the most important. Consider, e.g.,
issues of funding priorities and levels. Governmental initiatives are, by
definition, "political." As a result, science, and scientific effort, are often
compromised. Indeed, they may be misdirected, by the best scientific
lights; witness "Star Wars" and a variety of domestic front "wars," on
cancer, crime and poverty, and NASA's continued pursuit of the space
station. I do not suggest, of course, that the scientific community is
united in such matters. Among other important science/government
issues the role of "expert witnesses" in courts, and judicial policy and
practice in both criminal and civil trials also have received a great deal
of attention. 12
Uncertainty is inevitable when basic science is translated into
application. Controversy is inevitable when such translations take the
form of social policy. Why this is true is hardly a mystery.
Uncertainties and large margins of error abound when experimental
findings are extrapolated to real world conditions, especially when the
9 Adrian R. Tiemann, Risk, Technology, and Society, 7 RiskAnal. 11 (1987).
10 Phillipp H. Abelson, Incorporation of New Science into Risk Assessment, 250
Science 1497 (1990); Abelson, Federal Impediments to Scientific Research, 251
Science 605(1991).
11 Symposium on Scientific Evidence, 84 J. Grim. Law & Criminology 1 (1993).
12 Id.
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experiments have been conducted on laboratory animals. Causal
inferences from epidemiological data - real world and valuable as they
are - are fraught with uncertainty. Uncertainty is compounded when
such inferences are translated into social policy, and compounded
further still in the course of policy implementation.
Many laypersons misunderstand these uncertainties and are
unimpressed by the precision in terms of which risk assessments are
expressed. They are more impressed with other issues, and they are
more concerned when science and technology are shown to be - or
when they appear to be - culpable, as when ethically and morally
questionable experiments are revealed, or when technological
production processes result in degradation of the environment.
Moreover, many are distrustful of the organizations (in government,
industry and universities) in which science is carried out and technology
is produced - all bearing a heavy charge of responsibility for
protecting the public interest.
Science and Technology Under Attack
The lag between basic and applied knowledge is also special because
it contributes to current attacks on both science and technology. The
underlying theme of Michael Crichton's, Jurassic Park - emphasized
more in the novel than the motion picture - is thatscientists have sold
out; that they vill do anything to promote themselves, their scientific
interests and their economic well being. The motion picture, too, has
"antiscience undertones," as Richard Nicholson reminded us in a
Science editorial. 13 Novelist John Ralston Saul, turned essayist in The
Dictatorship of Reason in the West (the subtitle of his book), argues
that the purity of science, in which neither secrecy nor social interest
have a place, has been subverted by application:14
The line between... disinterested work and applied
science is theoretically clear. In practice it is confused.
Many scientists find themselves on both sides. Once
across on the side of application, a whole other set of
rules applies. Application involves the interests of race,
13 Postmodernism, 261 Science 143 (1993).
14 Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West 301 (1992).
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politics, sex and age, just for a start. Nonscientific
choices must be made. Secrecy becomes a tool of the
knowledge holder.
It is the confusion over how to deal with crossing the
line from theoretical to practical science which so
troubles the scientists. If, once across, they surrender all
power over knowledge, they quickly find themselves
orced by public and private authorities to do things
which disturb them for nonscientific reasons. The virtue
found in theoretical work is the disinterested purity of
the laws of nature. However, human civilization is always
"interested" and all the choices surrounding scientific
application eventually touch moral questions.
John Polanyi, 1986 chemistry Nobelist, calls Saul's book "a passionate
and personal tour of the follies of our age." 15 Polanyi argues that
"society, with the aid of scientists, must develop mechanisms of choice
which apply common sense, public interest and morality to the
development of scientific breakthroughs." 1 6
None of these criticisms are unfamiliar to the scientific community.
Most are debated regularly in Science and other public media. Of
particular relevance to the topic of this paper, the quality of scientific
work in many areas, particularly of science with broad applications to and
implications for the larger society, has been severely criticized, from
within as well as from outside the scientific community (see, in addition
to almost any issue of Science, many NAS/NRC assessments and
exhaustively researched reviews of scientific work in areas such as
identification and testing of toxic materials,1 7 forensic use of DNA
technology 18 and geological disposal of high level nuclear waste. 19
The judgment of scientists and those who develop and apply
technologies based on their work has also come under attack, as have their
ethical and moral sensibilities. The principal villain here is not the "mad
15 Frontispiece in the paperback edition (quoting prior statements by reviewers).
16 Paperback edition, at 304 (Saul quoting Polanyi).
17 See supra note 6.
18 Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, Forensic Science (1992).
19 Kristin S. Schrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against
Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste (1993).
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(or bad) scientist" of fiction, but concern over the social distribution of
hazards and atiendant risks.
How Fair is Safe Enough?
Until recently neither risk assessors nor risk managers have paid
much attention to the social distribution of health risks or of economic
costs and benefits associated with scientific applications. This is
changing in the risk analysis community, just as it is changing in the
scientific community, as evidenced by the attention given such issues at
recent meetings of AAAS and other professional associations. I had
sketched the major themes of my paper before the 1994 AAAS
preliminary program alerted me to the number of symposia devoted to
such topics as "Science, Ethics, & the Law," "Environmental Justice,"
"Public Perceptions and Scientific Reality in Environmental Risks," as
well as "Science Education and Reform," "Communicating Science"
and "Science for Everyone" - all eloquent testimony to the ascendancy
of "people problems" on the science agenda - and to the importance
of cultural lags represented by each of these areas of concern.
But why do these issues command such attention at this time?
Probably for many reasons, but let me suggest at least three: First,
again, spectacular successes achieved in several scientific and
technological areas in recent years, notably in molecular biblogy,
genetics and biotechnology, have raised fundamental issues of ethics,
morals and values. Second, problems associated with past scientific and
technological activity, chief among which are high- and low-level
nuclear waste disposal and clean-up of other toxic wastes, followed
closely by a host of other environmental concerns, which appear
increasingly to be shared in many nations throughout the world, are
seemingly intractable. 2 0 Both of these are exacerbated by a third
problem, past and recent failures of government agencies to perform
effectively 21 and by disclosures of radiation releases and
experimentation on human populations that were long kept secret.
20 Riley Dunlap, George H. Gallup, Jr. & Alec M. Gallup, Of Global Concern:
Results of the Health of the Planet Survey, Environment, Nov. 1993, at 7.
21 Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (1988).
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These and other instances of scientific dissembling and outright
deception, together with sometimes spectacular technological failures,
in turn poison public views of science and hamper productive dialogue
that might lead to solutions to these sorts of problems.2 2
In a seminal article published in 1987, Steve Rayner and Robin
Cantor (anthropologist and economist, respectively) argued that the
most "critical question facing societal risk managers is not 'How safe is
safe enough?' but 'How fair is safe enough?"' 23 While their exploratory
research concerned "the market acceptability of new nuclear-power
reactor technologies," research concerning public reactions to other
scientifically advanced technologies suggest that their argument may
have broader significance. Briefly, they argue that public constituencies
worry most about procedures by which consent is obtained for policy
decisions, the acceptability of principles used to apportion costs and
beiefits of such decisions, and whether those who make decisions and
manage and regulate technologies are worthy of fiduciary trust.
Issues of fairness lead inevitably to issues of trust. Many of the issues
raised by advances in science and technology bear on one or another
aspect of trust. Defining trust in terms of "expectations that social
actors have of one another in social relationships and social systems,"
sociologist Bernard Barber delineates three kinds of expectations that
involve the most fundamental meanings of trust: 1) expectations of
technical competence, 2) expectations that fiduciary obligations will be
discharged properly; and 3) the expectation that the "natural and moral
social orders" will be preserved.2
4
Surveys of the general public suggest that, compared to most other
institutional segments of society (business, labor, Congress, the.
executive branch of government) scientists have enjoyed, and continue
to enjoy, high levels of trust. Public trust is, of course, related to
22 William R. Freudenburg, Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the Art
of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 242 Science 44 (1988).
23 How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to Societal Technology
Choice, 7 Risk Anal. 3 (1987).
24 The Logic and Limits of Trust (1983).
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demonstrated technical competence. But it is also related to the
tradition of the disinterested scientific pursuit of knowledge. Both of
these aspects currently are under attack, for a variety of reasons but
primarily, it appears, because of the association of science with
technologies that produce, or are perceived to produce, hazards to
public health and safety, and because of the alliance of science,
government and economic production That alliance increasingly
includes institutions of higher learning which, for a variety of reasons -'
chiefly economic - have become more applied in their research
programs, with ties to major corporations.2 5 The "disinterestedness"
(and therefore the fiduciary accountability) of universities thus also
become suspect. For many in the general public, advances in molecular
biology, and particularly in biotechnology, also are perceived to
threaten the preservation of the moral and social orders.
The Problem of Recreancy
As knowledge-has become more esoteric and specialized, we human
beings have become moire dependent on specialized knowledge and
applications. We have all. become dependent on specialists who have
command and control over technologies related to specialized
knowledge. One result of both types of dependency is that trust in all
of its meanings assumes greater significance with respect to a broad
range of issues that are clouded with uncertainty and risk.
My colleague, Bill Freudenburg, has recently shown that support for
a high level nuclear waste facility is more closely related to trust in the
institutions that are charged with building and managing such a facility
than are traditional demographic categories (age, race, gender, social
class and political ideology). 2 6 Trust in these institutions is also more
closely related to support for such a facility than are even high levels of
proposed economic compensation, as economist Howard Kunreuther
and his colleagues discovered.2 7
25 Henry Etzkowitz, Entrepreneurial Scientists and Entrepreneurial Universities in
American Academic Science, 21 Minerva 2(1983).
26 Freudenburg, Risk and Recreancy: Weber, the Division of Labor, and the
Rationality of Risk Perceptions, 71 Social Forces 909 (1993).
27 Howard Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level Nuclear
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Freudenburg's analysis is compelling. While his empirical case
concerns a different public policy issue than that of primary concern
here, his theoretical argument is both more general and pertinent.
Briefly, he argues that, because of greater dependency on technical
expertise and performance, public evaluations and judgments in risk-
related matters are based primarily on whether people trust those with
the power and responsibility for making decisions in a socially
responsible way. Freudenburg proposes the concept of "recreancy" to
denote the failure of institutional actors to carry-out responsibilities
with the vigor and integrity necessary to warrant the trust that underlies
all institutional life. It is these types of failures, and beliefs and
suspicions regarding competence, the discharge of fiduciary obligations,
and even preservation of the natural and moral orders that underlie
many of the people problems now facing the scientific community. 28
Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy
Psychologist Paul Slovic has argued recently that the most
fundamental basis for conflicts and controversies regarding risk
management is not public ignorance or irrationality, but rather "our
remarkable form of participatory democracy, amplified by powerful
technological and social changes that systematically destroy trust".2 9
He notes that many studies suggest that "government and industry
officials who oversee the management of nuclear power and nonmedical
chemicals are not highly trusted."3 0
Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 RiskAnal. 469 (1990).
28 Langdon Winner's comments regarding the models used to forecast and assess
risks associated with a quite different social policy area (rebuilding the nation's
infrastructure, including the "communications superhighway") are consistent with
these themes, adding fuel to suspicions and distrust of science and technology, and of
scientists and technologists; see How Technology Reweaves the Fabric of Society,
Chronicle of Higher Education, Aug. 3, 1993 (letter).
29 Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RiskAnal. 675(1993). Sheila Jasanoff
also points to the participatory nature of the U.S. system of governance as an
important factor in risk-related controversies and policies, Risk Management and
Political.Culture (1986).
30 Id. See also (beyond nuclear power studies), D. B. McCallum et al., Public
Knowledge and Perceptions of Chemical Risks in Six Communities (1990); John
Graham, Laura Green & Marc Roberts, In Search of Safety- Chemicals and Cancer
Risk (1988).
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The fragility of trust has long been known. "Trustworthiness"
requires a great deal of confirming evidence, while its destruction
requires little.3 1 Slovic and his colleagues asked college students to
indicate which of 45 news events concerning a large nuclear power plant
in their community they thought would increase or decrease trust in the
management of the facility. Events judged to decrease trust were
endorsed by much higher percentages of the students than were those
judged to increase trust. For example, 60% rated falsification of
records as having a very powerful trust-decreasing impact versus the
18% who opted for the single most powerful trust-increasing event.
Given the exploratory nature of this research one must view the data
only as suggestive. Their consistency with other studies adds to their
importance, however. Moreover, that single most powerful trust
increasing event is most interesting: "An advisory board of local citizens
and environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is given
legal authority to shut the plant down if they believe it to be unsafe."3 2
Recall my earlier observation that people place a great deal of value on
control over risks.33
In drawing this paper to a close I note one other suggestive area of
analysis. Anthropologist Willett Kempton 3 4 studied the values
underlying lay perspectives on environmental problems. By means of
deep ethnographic interviews, Kempton found that respondents often
did not understand technical issues related to, e.g., global warming,
and they tended to relate concrete, personal experience in defining their
concerns (rather than abstract principles or scientific findings). When
probed as to the nature of their concerns, however, what they worried
31 Lee Clarke & James Short, Social Organization and Risk: Some Current
Controversies, 19 Ann. Rev. Sociology 375 (1993); Eugene Rosa & William
Freudenburg, The Historical Development of Public Reactions to Nuclear Power:
Implications for Nuclear Waste Policy in Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste
(Dunlap, Kraft & Rosa eds. 1993).
32 Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RiskAnal. 675(1993).
33 See supra note 27.
34 Lay Perspectives on Global Climate Change, 1 Global Env'1 Change: Human &
Policy Dimensions 183 (1991).
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about most was the effects of environmental degradation on future
generations. Surveys conducted by Howard Kunreuther and his
colleagues also found that "concern for risks to future generations" was
more critical to willingness to support a repository than were proposed
compensatory financial packages. 3 5
Conclusion
The concerns of this paper are much broader than trace element
discoveries. The fact that I have discussed nuclear-related issues at some
length reflects both my own work and the fact that more research has
been done on this issue than on any other.3 6
We have been warned against generalizing across biotechnology risk
areas 37 and caution surely must be exercised when generalizing across
other risk areas. Still, social science research on risk has found enough
similarities across a variety of risk areas to warrant a measure of
confidence in what has been learned about perceptions, decision making
processes and behaviors of individuals and organizations under
conditions of risk and uncertainty.
Briefly, and in part only, these studies converge on a set of public
concerns regarding risks and uncertainties that are associated with
advances in science and technology. Cultural lags are background for
these concerns, often exacerbating their problematic nature and leading
to further confusion as other institutions adapt, resist, and at times
distort the meaning and the significance of scientific discoveries. Unless
checked, they are likely to become more problematic and more general
across more areas of science. The nature of science, technology and
institutions virtually guarantees that this will happen.
Public concerns center - to a greater extent than on issues of
narrowly defined self interest - on such issues as the fairness and
trustworthiness of institutions (including science), and concern for
future generations. People fear what they cannot apprehend and what
35 See supra note 27.
36 See Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste, supra note 30.
37 Henry 1. Miller & Douglas Gunary, Serious Flaws in the Horizontal Approach
to Biotechnology Risk, 262 Science 1500 (1993).
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they comprehend as technological failure and the lack of scientific
candor. The lament of scientists that "when we are right, no one
remembers, but when we are wrong, no one forgets" is in my view
misplaced. To err is human, for scientists as well as others. More serious
are the lack of candor, secrecy and suspicions that some scientists -
even if, objectively, only a few - are willing to "sell out" to promote
their own interests, as well as occasional instances of scientific fraud, all
of which are more damaging to credibility, legitimacy and trust than is
error. These in turn give rise to protest and to demands for control over
technological development, demands that are, after all, consistent with
democratic governance.
While they are sometimes intemperate and extreme,
pronouncements against science may also reflect deep convictions and
fears among a broad spectrum of citizens, from the intelligentsia to
persons on the street who may not understand either the technical or
the philosophical bases for controversy and are too busy coping with
everyday problems to be much concerned. Many eminent scientists and
policy makers caution against overselling science, while urging greater
recognition of its limitations.
The authors of In Search for Safety, a product of the Harvard
University Scientific Conflict Mapping Project, conclude a chapter on
scientific evidence concerning benzene and cancer with a question:
"What institutions and processes can society create to disentangle all
the factors that make up scientific" results - and to what extent can
one even hope to do so?"38 In his Foreword to that book, physicist
Harvey Brooks writes that its most important conclusion is that
regulatory problems result in part from "excessive and unrealistic
expectations of science."39 He continues:4 0
We tend to exaggerate what we really know through
science unless we are challenged by the social
consequences of the findings. When the interpretation of
38 Supra note 30 (emphasis added).
39 Supra note 30, at viii (1988).
40 Id. (emphasis added).
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scientific findings has large distributional consequences
for different groups - health risks for some and
economic dislocation for others, for example - we
become more aware of the large uncertainties in our
knowledge and of the inadequacies of our theories and
models... the first instinct of the scientists is to close
ranks and produce a consensus that papers over their
disagreements and the underlying uncertainties. This
course of action is powerfully reinforced by regulators
who need seemingly objective information to defend the
decisions they must make.... Yet, to the extent that
scientists suppress uncertainties, they are in effect
arrogating to themselves a political decision for which
they are not accountable, since each choice of
information within a wide band of uncertainty creates
different winners and losers and hence is inherently
political.... Only if they are completely honest about
the extent of their ignorance are they playing a role
appropriate to democratic polity.
So, how do we extricate ourselves from this conundrum? And is
there any hope? The research reviewed in this paper suggests an even
broader mandate than the question raised by the authors of In Search of
Safety, viz. what James Coleman refers to as "the rational
reconstruction of society" by means of the design or the redesign of
institutions. 4 1 By virtue of rapid social change, institutions are
continuously being reconstructed, whether by design or by necessity,
usually unguided by design. Coleman's argument is complex, and I
cannot here do it justice. Briefly, however, it involves creating formal
organizations that bring together different stakeholder interests and
provide incentives for building the consensus necessary to confront and
solve problems. Consensus is achieved by creating formal structures that
promote the development of social capital and informally arrived at
incentives for problem solving.
Coleman cautions that simply tinkering with existing institutions is
not likely to solve many of the problems created by the decline of
primordial institutions such as religion and the family. It is not much of
a stretch to add other institutions in decline - independent scientific
41 The Rational Reconstruction of Society, 58 Am. Sociological Rev. 1 (1993).
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investigators, political parties, family farms, and small businesses, all of
which continue to occupy important niches in society, but none of
which is capable of solving mounting problems such as those that are
involved in STS relationships.
If Coleman's proposal sounds a bit like "reinventing government," it
certainly has implications for the way governments function. If it
sounds utopian, it is nevertheless consistent with research indicating that
when those with conflicting interests are brought into decision making
on a collaborative basis, they are more likely to work cooperatively
toward solutions to problems. Problems such as those being discussed
at these meetings do not admit of final solutions - all the more reason
to design, construct, and institutionalize organizations that can bring
together parties to controversies driven by advances in science and
technology, on the one hand, and on the other by broader social
concerns. Some existing organizations may provide models for new
constructed organizations designed to address science-technology-and
society problems - the Office of Technology Assessment comes to
mind - and "natural experiments" in problem solving are being
attempted in many places. There is hope, and we must get on with the
tasks at hand.
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